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I continued about the late disclosure of Americans. Retrieved 10 May Brown Bananas and Hope In the papuas insecurity state failure in the indonesian of , Baird developed observing his network in Nassau County, 60s synopsis. As detailed below, the evidence we were able to collect suggests that while obtaining official permission has almost always been difficult, the numbers have varied somewhat depending on policies and priorities in Jakarta. On 27 November , both the Francophone African and Indian resolutions were put to the vote failed to gain a two—thirds majority at the UNGA. He worked in Papua, Indonesia from until ; he has also worked in the Indonesian provinces of Aceh, Central Sulawesi, and Maluku, as well as Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia.
Archived from the original on 6 February Retrieved 6 July Jakarta Post. Archived from the original on 20 November Retrieved 18 November Archived from the original on 18 November Retrieved 20 November Rappler in Indonesian. Archived from the original on 1 December Archived from the original on 19 November Freewest Papua. They tried a second large-scale attempt at bringing him to justice in September by deploying over 1, personnel , but this too was in vain, as was the latest attempt in December. The longer that this high-value and ultra-violent terrorist remains at large, the more likely it is that he and his group will plot and eventually carry out more anti-Christian violence, although they could strike against their fellow Muslims as a fear-inciting gesture or as a distraction to divert the attention of government forces.
The second militant possibility for attacking majority-Christian North Sulawesi province comes most realistically from the Abu Sayyaf group in the southern Philippines. Addressing the first point, the Maluku violence of was representative of a brief period of peripheral anarchy that the government had difficulty efficiently putting down. Disturbances continued to break out all throughout the year in one of the two provinces, demonstrating that the post-Suharto authorities were either unwilling or unable to put the lid on it completely.
West Papua is the most violent area of Indonesia. Indonesian security forces battle the country's last active separatist insurgency there. The majority of. Papua's Insecurity: State Failure in the Indonesian Periphery. Bobby Anderson. ISSN (print) and (electronic). ISBN
This makes it a critical zone for securing the sea lines of communication necessary for administering West Papua, and any extensive disruption of this could embolden the West Papua movement to intensify their on-the-ground and international information operations. Jakarta could still theoretically administer and control the territory even in the midst of a massive rebellion or ethnic cleansing in the Malukus, but it may have to immediately divert some of its Papua-based troops in order to do so, which by itself could also signal to the rebels that they have an historic but limited opportunity for launching a grand offensive.
Also, just as how the US has absolutely no track record of supporting legitimate independence movements and other humanitarian concerns all across the world for their own sake, so too would it have cynical reasons for covertly intervening in West Papua if it eventually decides to do so. However it happens to come about, if West Papua becomes to the Western world what East Timor was to it back in the early and mids, then a climate of inevitable independence could settle over the region and embolden the locals to more substantially rise up against Jakarta, regardless of the very real risk to their lives that this would predictably entail.
It may be that the US decides to back down or never even intended to get directly involved in the first place. Using the Papuans as cannon fodder would be similar to how the Americans used the Hungarians in by offering them false hopes of a supportive intervention, but only to let them down after the fact. The last Hybrid War scenario that could predictably strike Indonesia comes not from the country itself, but from its formerly occupied territory of East Timor. Looking at recent history, this somewhat mirrors the destabilization, albeit in a more endemic manner.
Back then, it was Indonesian-affiliated militias that were sowing chaos throughout the country, but this time, the problem clearly came from society itself. Bundy told the President that "most of the specialists believed that the Secretary's [Rusk's] respect for the Australians and dislike of Sukarno has led him to take a position in the UN debate which, if continued, can only favor the Communists. As a result, the United States encouraged both the Netherlands and Indonesia to engage in bilateral negotiations and suggested that U. Secretary-General U Thant should serve as a third party moderator.
The Dutch insisted that the transfer of WNG have some provision for self-determination; the Indonesians required that the Dutch agree, as a prerequisite to the talks, that WNG's administration not its sovereignty be transferred to Indonesia. President Kennedy then sent his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to Indonesia and the Netherlands to encourage bilateral negotiations under U. While Robert Kennedy could give no assurances to the Indonesians that the Netherlands would agree to transfer WNG to Indonesia, he could say that the United States believed this was the likely outcome.
Robert Kennedy himself feared he would be caught in the middle of the conflicting demands and be able to satisfy neither party. Rusk was still unwilling to give the Indonesians an assurance that the Dutch would not accept as the basis for talks. In March , Luns came to Washington to meet with U. The President turned him down flat.
The Indonesians also agreed to talks without preconditions provided that the transfer of WNG could be the first issue raised by Indonesia. The Ambassadorial level secret talks, held in Middleburg, Virginia, in late March , began with promise but were soon stalemated, primarily because of Indonesia intransigence. To make matters worse, the Dutch and Indonesians engaged in sporadic naval engagements in the waters around WNG. It became clear in Washington that a demarche to Sukarno would be required to keep the negotiations moving.
The transfer process would take 2 years, with Indonesians replacing U. The United Nations would assist inhabitants in expressing their freedom of choice at a later date to be negotiated. Sukarno agreed to the formula , but the Netherlands did not. They claimed it was a shocking betrayal by the United States. To get the Indonesians to resume secret talks, the Department instructed Jones to inform them that while the United States could not guarantee the success of the negotiations, there was a reasonable chance that they would succeed.
It was released as a U. After some hesitation, , , Indonesia also agreed. The outstanding issues for the talks were the Indonesian desire to shorten the 2-year transition period and the Netherlands insistence that it was the absolute minimum time for a transfer. Both sides were concerned about mechanisms for self-determination.
Indonesia wanted to minimize the role of the United Nations; the Netherlands wanted to maximize it. As the talks proceeded, the Indonesians proved difficult, insisting on a 1-year transition period, minimal U. They threatened to recall Foreign Minister Subandrio, who had joined the talks in Middleburg. At Department of State suggestion , President Kennedy meet with Subandrio and told him that if the Indonesians resorted to force when they were on the brink of achieving one on the greatest diplomatic victories of all time, the United States would switch sides and support the Dutch.
In the face of this direct threat, Sukarno acceded to revised terms of understanding whereby the Dutch would transfer administration to the United Nations, which could then start transferring administration to Indonesia after May 1, less than a year. Indonesian forces within WNG would be at the disposal of the U.
One year before "self-determination," which could be no later than , the United Nations would appoint a staff to advise and assist with arrangements. The Indonesian flag could be hoisted along with the U.
The agreement was almost a total victory for Indonesia and a defeat for the Netherlands, who wanted to leave the territory, but not on terms that assured that WNG would soon be part of Indonesia. The underlying reason that the Kennedy administration pressed the Netherlands to accept this agreement was that it believed that Cold War considerations of preventing Indonesia from going Communist overrode the Dutch case.
The Kennedy administration then sought to capitalize on the good will it had won in Indonesia by establishing better relations with Sukarno and upgrading U. The plan to win over Indonesia had mixed results. Sukarno opposed the formation of the Malaysia Federation with threats and a guerrilla campaign. A mission by Governor Wilson Wyatt succeeded in defusing the potential crisis. Jones suggested that the downward trend in Indonesia made a Presidential trip even more important and hoped that a visit by Kennedy would moderate Sukarno.
The Department agreed to inform Sukarno that Kennedy would visit Indonesia early in a second term provided Sukarno abandoned his policy of confrontation with the United Kingdom and Malaysia. On November 19, Jones, who was in Washington for consultations, received a commitment from the President to go to Indonesia. Three days later, Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. The Johnson administration would face new challenges in U. Miffed at not being consulted, Sukarno convinced himnself it was a colonialist plot; the Philippines opposed the federation because of their claims to parts of North Borneo.
The Philippines pursued its claim through diplomatic channels, and Indonesia embarked on a policy of confrontation and guerrilla war in early One of Sukarno's tactics was a demand for a referendum in the Borneo Territories under U. The United States supported the idea even though it delayed postponement of the inauguration of the federation.